i n our article, we wrote that speaking of neuroethics-or nanoethics or gen ethics-is not unreasonable. We also said that, if one does speak in such terms, one science & society cor resp ondence should be aware of three potential problems: of reinventing the bioethical wheel; of exag gerating what the science can teach us about who we are; and of exaggerating or mistak ing what bioethics research can deliver. in his comment, Eric racine does not address the grounds we offered to support our iden tification of these three potential problems, but instead responds to what he calls two "implicit assumptions".
He writes that "the authors opt for the perspective that neuroethics can contrib ute to 'carving up bioethics into ever more specialized subfields' and to 'squander ing scarce resources'" (parens & Johnston, 2007; racine, 2008 ). yet, racine's letter does not allay that worry. He says, for exam ple, that "neuroethics is bringing new ethi cal perspectives and contexts to consider in their own right with the help of new col leagues and students" (racine, 2008)-in part because bioethics has failed to do so. Without a doubt, neuroethics has attracted the attention of many smart, creative and productive people who call attention to ethical issues in new technological and scientific contexts. However, we ques tion whether these people contribute new ethical perspectives or whether these new contexts raise new ethical questions. What these people are doing in these new con texts can be very important, but we worry that we will waste time and resources if we fail to notice the familiarity of the ethical problems and the finite number of possible ethical responses.
Our other assumption, according to racine, is "that neuroethics is somehow addressing only ethical issues associated with technological developments" (parens & Johnston, 2007; racine, 2008) . We do not assume this; the problems we raised are not limited to new technologies. the first prob lem described in the previous paragraph has to do with hyperbole about the novelty of the ethical issues arising in the context of technological-and scientific-develop ments. the second problem we explored in our article was to do with hyperbole about how much neuroscience can tell us about who we are. the third problem has to do with hyperbole about how much ethicists can tell policymakers, clinicians, members of the public or anyone else about what they should do, think or believe.
Finally, we would emphasize that the three problems we worry about are not in any way potential problems only for neuro ethics; those problems might arise in any area of ethical inquiry that deals with new science and technology. 
